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CHAGARES, Circuit Judge. 
 At issue in this appeal is whether Michael Calabretta’s 
prior state conviction for eluding in the second degree 
qualifies as a “crime of violence” under the advisory United 
States Sentencing Guidelines (the “Guidelines,” or 
“U.S.S.G.”).  In light of Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 
2551 (2015), we hold that the District Court plainly erred in 
considering the state conviction to be a “crime of violence” 
under the Guidelines.  We will vacate Calabretta’s sentence 




 On March 15, 2013, Calabretta pleaded guilty to a 
two-count superseding information, charging him with 
conspiracy to distribute and possess with the intent to 
distribute marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 
841(b)(1)(B) and 846, and with conspiracy to launder the 
proceeds of drug trafficking activity, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 1956(a)(1)(A)(i) and 1956(h).  Calabretta was subject to a 
five-year mandatory minimum sentence pursuant to the 
stipulated charges in the plea agreement.  
 
 In advance of sentencing, the parties and the District 
Court received a copy of the Presentence Report (the “PSR”), 
which included Calabretta’s Criminal History Category and 
Total Offense Level.  The PSR considered multiple prior state 
convictions in calculating Calabretta’s Criminal History 
Category, including a 1990 conviction for “Death by Auto” 
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and a 1994 conviction for “Eluding in the Second Degree.”  
The PSR also considered those two convictions to constitute 
“crimes of violence” pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2, and 
accordingly designated Calabretta as a “career offender” 
under the Guidelines.1  Application of the career offender 
Guideline increased Calabretta’s Criminal History Category 
from III to VI, and increased his Total Offense Level from 29 
to 31.  With the career offender Guideline, Calabretta’s 
recommended Guidelines sentencing range was 188 to 235 
months of imprisonment.  Had the career offender Guideline 
not applied, his recommended Guidelines sentencing range 
would have been 108 to 135 months. 
 
 At sentencing, the District Court adopted the PSR’s 
calculation of Criminal History Category VI and Total 
Offense Level of 31, which included the application of the 
career offender Guideline.  After considering the sentencing 
factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (“section 3553(a)”), 
the District Court imposed a sentence of 120 months on each 
count to be served concurrently.  Calabretta’s sentence thus 
reflected a 68-month downward variance from the advisory 
Guidelines sentencing range.  
 
In imposing Calabretta’s sentence, the District Court 
extensively discussed Calabretta’s earlier criminal 
convictions.  The District Court noted that Calabretta became 
“involved in this particular scheme approximately five years 
after he was released from jail on his prior convictions and . . 
. [he] should have learned [his] lesson.”  Appendix (“App.”) 
141.  The District Court also indicated that “a very substantial 
sentence is required,” in part, to “get through to [Calabretta] 
                                              
1 Under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a), a defendant is a career offender 
if “(1) the defendant was at least eighteen years old at the 
time the defendant committed the instant offense of 
conviction; (2) the instant offense of conviction is a felony 
that is either a crime of violence or a controlled substance 
offense; and (3) the defendant has at least two prior felony 
convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled 
substance offense.”  The District Court adopted the PSR’s 
finding that all three prongs of the career offender Guideline 
were met.  
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that if [he] thought [he] had reformed, reforming by 
becoming a drug dealer is not reforming.”  App. 142.  
Additionally, the District Court denied Calabretta’s request 
for a two-level reduction in his offense level, in anticipation 
of an amendment to the Guidelines.  The District Court noted 
that Calabretta would be ineligible for a sentencing reduction 
under the amendment “given [his] prior criminal record.”  
App. 132.   
 
 On September 11, 2014, the District Court entered the 
final judgment of conviction and sentence, which reflected 
the 120-month term of imprisonment imposed.  Calabretta 




 At his sentencing, Calabretta did not challenge 
whether his state conviction for eluding in the second degree 
is a “crime of violence,” so we will review the District 
Court’s determination of that issue for plain error.  To 
establish plain error, Calabretta must show that (1) the 
District Court erred; (2) the error was clear or obvious, rather 
than subject to reasonable dispute; and (3) the error affected 
the appellant’s substantial rights, which in the ordinary course 
means that there is a reasonable probability that the error 
affected the outcome of the proceedings.  United States v. 
Marcus, 560 U.S. 258, 262 (2010); United States v. Tai, 750 
F.3d 309, 313-14 (3d Cir. 2014).  If all three elements are 
established, then the Court may exercise its discretion to 
award relief.  See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 736 
(1993).  That discretion should be exercised only in cases 
where the error “seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or 
public reputation of judicial proceedings.”  Id. (quotation 
marks omitted); see also United States v. Stinson, 734 F.3d 




                                              
2 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 
3231, and we have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 
and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). 
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 Calabretta argues that the District Court plainly erred 
in treating his conviction for eluding as a “crime of violence” 
under the Sentencing Guidelines, and that his case should be 
remanded for resentencing.3  The Guidelines define a “crime 
of violence” as:  
 
any offense under federal or state law, 
punishable by imprisonment for a term 
exceeding one year, that — 
1. has as an element the use, 
attempted use, or threatened 
use of physical force against 
the person of another, or 
2. is burglary of a dwelling, 
arson, or extortion, involves 
use of explosives, or otherwise 
involves conduct that presents 
a serious potential risk of 
physical injury to another. 
U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a) (emphasis added).  The Government has 
conceded that Calabretta’s eluding conviction qualifies as a 
“crime of violence” only under what is known as the 
“residual clause” of the Guideline — as “otherwise 
involv[ing] conduct that presents a serious potential risk of 
physical injury to another.”4  See Gov’t Letter Pursuant to 
Fed. R. App. P. 28(j) (Aug. 12, 2015). 
                                              
3 Calabretta raised a number of other issues on appeal.  We 
will not consider those here, as our determination that the 
District Court committed plain error when it considered 
Calabretta’s eluding conviction as a “crime of violence” is 
dispositive of his appeal.  
4 In New Jersey, eluding in the second degree is defined as 
follows:  “Any person, while operating a motor vehicle on 
any street or highway in this State or any vessel . . . who 
knowingly flees or attempts to elude any police or law 
enforcement officer after having received any signal from 
such officer to bring the vehicle or vessel to a full stop 
commits a crime of the third degree; except that, a person is 






While Calabretta’s appeal was pending, the United 
States Supreme Court decided Johnson v. United States, 135 
S. Ct. 2551 (2015), which held that an identically worded 
residual clause in the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”) 
was unconstitutional.  Under ACCA, defendants are subject 
to a more severe punishment if they have three or more 
previous convictions for a “violent felony” — which 
included, under the statute’s residual clause, “conduct that 
presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.”  
18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii).  Supreme Court precedent prior 
to Johnson had required courts to use a “categorical” 
approach to determine whether a crime fell within ACCA’s 
residual clause.  See Sykes v. United States, 564 U.S. 1 
(2011); James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192 (2007).  The 
categorical approach prescribed that courts “picture the kind 
of conduct that the crime involves in ‘the ordinary case,’ and 
to judge whether that abstraction presents a serious potential 
risk of physical injury.”  Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2557 (quoting 
James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 208 (2007)).  
 
But in Johnson, the Supreme Court overruled its earlier 
cases — Sykes and James — that required courts to use the 
categorical approach to determine whether a crime was 
included in ACCA’s residual clause.  Rather, the Supreme 
Court invalidated, as unconstitutionally vague, ACCA’s 
residual clause.  The Supreme Court held that defendants 
were denied due process of law when their sentences were 
increased after application of ACCA’s residual clause 
because the “indeterminacy of the wide-ranging inquiry 
required by the residual clause both denies fair notice to 
defendants and invites arbitrary enforcement by judges.”  
Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2557.  The Court ruled that the 
indeterminacy inherent in both inquiries under the categorical 
approach — (1) imagining the conduct in “the ordinary case” 
of a crime, and (2) imagining the “serious potential risk” of 
that “ordinary case” — was, at least in combination, 
                                                                                                     
to elude creates a risk of death or injury to any person.”  N.J. 
Stat. Ann. § 2C:29-2(b) (emphasis added).  
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unconstitutionally vague.5  Id. at 2557-58.  The Court also 
noted the practical results of prior jurisprudence interpreting 
the residual clause:  numerous splits among the federal courts 
regarding the type of inquiry for determining what a crime is 
in “the ordinary case,” and ultimately, which crimes fall 
within the residual clause.  Id. at 2560.  Therefore, the 
Supreme Court held that “[i]nvoking so shapeless a provision 
to condemn someone to prison . . . does not comport with the 




Under the plain error standard, we must first consider 
whether the District Court committed an error when it 
considered the eluding conviction as a “crime of violence” in 
determining Calabretta to be a career offender under the 
Guidelines.  Both the Government and Calabretta argue that, 
under Johnson, the identically worded “residual clause” of § 
4B1.2 of the Guidelines is likewise invalid.  This question, 
however, is one for the courts — not the parties — to decide.  
“Confessions of error . . . do not relieve this Court of the 
performance of the judicial function. . . . [O]ur judgments are 
precedents, and the proper administration of the criminal law 
cannot be left merely to the stipulation of parties.”  Sibron v. 
New York, 392 U.S. 40, 58 (1968) (quotation marks and 
citations omitted).   
 
                                              
5 Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for the Johnson majority, 
indicated the various methods a court could use (and, indeed, 
had employed) under the categorical approach:  “How does 
one go about deciding what kind of conduct the ‘ordinary 
case’ of a crime involves?  ‘A statistical analysis of the state 
reporter?  A survey?  Expert evidence?  Google?  Gut 
instinct?’”  Id. at 2557.  “The residual clause offers no 
reliable way to choose between . . . competing accounts of 
what [the] ‘ordinary’ [crime] involves.”  Id. at 2558.  Further, 
“the residual clause leaves uncertainty about how much risk it 
takes for a crime to qualify as a violent felony.  It is one thing 
to apply an imprecise ‘serious potential risk’ standard to real-
world facts; it is quite another to apply it to a judge-imagined 
abstraction.”  Id. 
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We hold that the “residual clause” in § 4B1.2 of the 
Guidelines is unconstitutionally vague.6  This holding flows 
                                              
6 The courts of appeals are split on this question.  Compare 
United States v. Madrid, 805 F.3d 1204, 1210-11 (10th Cir. 
2015) (holding that the residual clause in § 4B1.2(a)(2) is 
unconstitutionally vague), with United States v. Matchett, 802 
F.3d 1185, 1193-96 (11th Cir. 2015) (declining to apply 
vagueness principles to the advisory Guidelines, and holding 
§ 4B1.2(a)(2) to be constitutional).  See also United States v. 
Pawlak, 822 F.3d 902, 911 (6th Cir. 2016) (holding that the 
residual clause of § 4B1.2(a) is unconstitutionally vague); 
United States v. Welch, __ F. App’x __, 2016 WL 536656, at 
*4 (2d Cir. 2016) (summary order) (same).  The Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has also indicated in dictum 
that § 4B1.2(a)(2) may be unconstitutionally vague.  Ramirez 
v. United States, 799 F.3d 845, 856 (7th Cir. 2015) (“In 
Johnson v. United States, the Supreme Court held that the 
identically worded residual clause of the Armed Career 
Criminal Act is unconstitutionally vague.  We have 
interpreted both residual clauses identically, and so we 
proceed on the assumption that the Supreme Court’s 
reasoning applies to section 4B1.2 as well.  This is a point, 
however, that neither side has briefed, and it may warrant 
attention on remand.” (citations omitted)).  Finally, it is worth 
noting that the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has 
issued two divided panel opinions on this issue.  In United 
States v. Taylor, 803 F.3d 931 (8th Cir. 2015), the court 
vacated the defendant’s sentence and remanded for 
resentencing.  The court acknowledged that although there 
was circuit precedent holding that the Guidelines were not 
susceptible to a vagueness attack, that holding was called into 
question by Johnson.  The court left the question to be 
decided in the first instance by the district court.  Id. at 933.  
However, a later panel of that court found that any such 
sentencing error was not “obvious” or “plain” in light of the 
circuit precedent holding that advisory Guidelines could not 
be void for vagueness.  See United States v. Ellis, 815 F.3d 
419, 421 (8th Cir. 2016).  The United States Supreme Court 
has recently granted a petition for writ of certiorari on this 
question that has divided the courts of appeals.  See United 
States v. Beckles, 616 F. App’x 415 (11th Cir. 2015), cert. 
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from our prior case law wherein we have interpreted the 
“crime of violence” definition in the Guidelines identically to 
the “violent felony” definition in ACCA.7  For example, in 
United States v. Hopkins, 577 F.3d 507 (3d Cir. 2009), we 
considered whether a second degree misdemeanor escape 
offense under Pennsylvania law qualified as a crime of 
violence under the residual clause of section 4B1.2.  The case 
was remanded to us by the Supreme Court to be considered 
further in light of Chambers v. United States, 555 U.S. 122 
(2009), an ACCA decision dealing with whether the offense 
of failing to report for incarceration was a violent felony.  See 
Hopkins v. United States, 555 U.S. 1132 (2009).  We applied 
Chambers and held that while the Supreme Court in that 
decision “was not called upon to construe the career offender 
provision of the Sentencing Guidelines, the definition of a 
violent felony under the ACCA is sufficiently similar to the 
definition of a crime of violence under the Sentencing 
Guidelines that authority interpreting one is generally applied 
to the other.”  577 F.3d at 511 (footnote omitted).  In 
addition, we observed that the validity of our holding was 
“demonstrated by the Supreme Court’s remand order in this 
case.”  Id. 
 
More recently, in United States v. Marrero, 743 F.3d 
389 (3d Cir. 2014), we considered whether a simple assault 
                                                                                                     
granted, 2016 WL 1029080 (U.S. June 27, 2016) (No. 15-
8544).  
7 The Sentencing Commission has also recognized the 
connection of the Guidelines residual clause to that of ACCA.  
The Sentencing Commission has indicated that the “crime of 
violence” definition in § 4B1.2 is “derived from 18 U.S.C. § 
924(e).”  See U.S.S.G. app. C, amend. 268 (eff. Nov. 1, 
1989).  And as of January 2016, the Sentencing Commission 
has proposed an amendment that would eliminate the residual 
clause of § 4B1.2.  The amendment will go into effect on 
August 1, 2016, unless Congress acts to the contrary.  See 
U.S. Sentencing Commission, Amendment to the Sentencing 





was a crime of violence under the Guidelines residual clause 
of section 4B1.2.  Notably, the case was back before a panel 
of our Court after being remanded by the Supreme Court in 
light of its decision in Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 
2276 (2013) — a decision, like Chambers, involving 
application of the identical “violent felony” provision of 
ACCA.  See Marrero v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2732 
(2013).  Our analysis relied upon numerous cases decided 
under ACCA.  743 F.3d at 394-401.  We held that although 
those cases “involved sentencing enhancements under 
[ACCA] rather than the career offender Guideline, they 
nevertheless bind our analysis.”  Id. at 394 n.2 (emphasis 
added).  We explained that “‘[p]recedent . . . requires the 
application of case law interpreting “violent felony” in ACCA 
to “crime of violence” in U.S.S.G. 4B1.2[] because of the 
substantial similarity of the two sections.’”  Id. (quoting 
United States v. Herrick, 545 F.3d 53, 58 (1st Cir. 2008)). 
 
This approach of similarly interpreting the two residual 
clauses remains appropriate for the case before us now.  Prior 
to Johnson, courts in this circuit were instructed to use the 
same categorical approach under both residual clauses for 
determining whether a conviction qualifies as a crime of 
violence — that is, “whether the elements of the offense are 
of the type that would justify its inclusion within the residual 
provision, without inquiring into the specific conduct of this 
particular offender.”  Marrero, 743 F.3d at 395 (quotation 
marks and emphasis omitted).  But in Johnson, the Supreme 
Court held that the indeterminacy inherent in the categorical 
approach, under ACCA, denied defendants due process by 
“den[ying] fair notice to defendants” and “invit[ing] arbitrary 
enforcement by judges.”  135 S. Ct. at 2557.   
 
It is apparent that if ACCA’s residual clause “invites 
arbitrary enforcement,” id., so does the residual clause in § 
4B1.2.  The process by which a sentencing court determines 
whether a prior conviction is a “crime of violence” is the 
same process that the Supreme Court held to be fraught with 
indeterminacy under ACCA.  And the result of this 
indeterminate process — whether or not a defendant is 
designated a career offender under § 4B1.2 — will shift the 
“benchmark” or “framework” of the district court’s 
sentencing determination by changing the recommended 
 11 
 
sentencing range.  See Peugh v. United, 133 S. Ct. 2072, 2083 
(2013) (indicating that the advisory Guidelines serve as a 
“framework” for “anchor[ing]” sentencing decisions with the 
purpose of achieving “uniformity” in sentencing); Gall v. 
United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49 (2007) (indicating that the 
Guidelines, although advisory, “should be the starting point 
and the initial benchmark” in order to “secure nationwide 
consistency” in sentences imposed).  See also Pawlak, 822 
F.3d at 906 (“Peugh reflects the Court’s judgment that the 
Guidelines are subject to constitutional challenges because 
the Guidelines are the mandatory starting point for sentencing 
determinations and district courts can be reversed for failing 
to correctly apply them despite the judges’ discretion to 
deviate from the recommended range.  The Supreme Court's 
reasoning in Peugh rests on the very same principles of fair 
notice and avoiding arbitrary enforcement underlying the 
doctrine of due process.”) (citations omitted).  See generally 
28 U.S.C. § 994(f) (“The Commission, in promulgating 
guidelines . . . shall promote the purposes set forth . . . with 
particular attention to the requirements . . . for providing 
certainty and fairness in sentencing and reducing unwarranted 
sentence disparities.”).  This takes us back to first principles 
in sentencing, under which we require that courts calculate a 
defendant’s Guidelines range as the first step in any 
sentencing, prior to application of the sentencing factors set 
out at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).  United States v. Gunter, 462 F.3d 
237, 247 (3d Cir. 2006).  “[W]hen the starting point for the § 
3553(a) analysis is incorrect, the end point, i.e., the resulting 
sentence can rarely be shown to be unaffected.”  United 
States v. Langford, 516 F.3d 205, 217 (3d Cir. 2008).  Thus, a 
defendant’s recommended sentence (and ultimate sentence 
imposed) will likely be affected by how the sentencing court 
determines whether a prior conviction, viewed only in the 
abstract and not with reference to real-world facts, is a “crime 
of violence” under the § 4B1.2 residual clause.   
 
Our holding also flows from our prior case law that 
considered constitutional vagueness challenges to the 
Guidelines.  For example, in United States v. Maurer, 639 
F.3d 72, 78 n.4 (3d Cir. 2011), we held that U.S.S.G. § 
2G2.2(b)(4) was not unconstitutionally vague because it gave 
“a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of the conduct to 
which it applies” and did not “authorize or encourage 
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arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.”  See also United 
States v. Jones, 979 F.2d 317, 319-20 (3d Cir. 1992) (holding 
that U.S.S.G § 2D1.1(c)(6) is not void for vagueness), 
superseded by Guideline on other grounds, U.S.S.G. app. C, 
amend. 487 (eff. Nov. 1, 1993), as recognized in United 
States v. Roberson, 194 F.3d 408, 417 (3d Cir. 1999).  Our 
case law is supported by the Supreme Court’s recognition that 
the Guidelines are sufficiently law-like to be subject to certain 
limits imposed by the Constitution.  See, e.g., Peugh, 133 S. 
Ct. at 2082 (holding that erroneously applying amended 
Guidelines that are advisory but still increase a defendant’s 
recommended sentence violates the Ex Post Facto Clause, as 
the “change in law presents a sufficient risk of increasing the 
measure of punishment attached to the covered crimes” 
(quotation marks omitted)).  See also United States v. Savani, 
733 F.3d 56, 66 (3d Cir. 2013) (holding that the rule of lenity 
applies to the Guidelines).  
 
We note, however, that the Court of Appeals for the 
Eleventh Circuit has declined to apply the vagueness doctrine 
to the advisory Guidelines.  See United States v. Matchett, 
802 F.3d 1185, 1194-95 (11th Cir. 2015) (holding that the § 
4B1.2 residual clause was not invalid after Johnson).  But the 
court in Matchett focused only on whether the advisory 
Guidelines could deny fair notice to a criminal defendant, and 
not whether a criminal defendant is protected against arbitrary 
enforcement in an advisory Guidelines sentencing system.  
See id. at 1194.  We conclude, for the reasons previously 
discussed, that regardless of whether defendants are entitled 
to “fair notice” under an advisory Guidelines system,8 the due 
                                              
8 The Matchett court premised its holding that the “vagueness 
doctrine, which rests on a lack of notice, does not apply to 
advisory guidelines” on Irizarry v. United States, 553 U.S. 
708 (2008).  Matchett, 802 F.3d at 1194 (quotation marks, 
alterations, and citation omitted).  But the conclusion in 
Matchett that criminal defendants are never entitled to fair 
notice under an advisory Guidelines system does not 
necessarily flow from Irizarry.  Under Irizarry, defendants do 
not have a due process right over any expectation to be 
sentenced within the advisory Guidelines range, when a 
district court, after considering the sentencing factors outlined 
in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), applies a discretionary variance and 
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process concerns over arbitrary enforcement are implicated 
here.  See United States v. Madrid, 805 F.3d 1204, 1210-11 
(10th Cir. 2015) (“If one iteration of the clause is 
unconstitutionally vague, so too is the other. . . . Because the 
Guidelines are the beginning of all sentencing determinations, 
and in light of the unavoidable uncertainty and arbitrariness 
of adjudication under the residual clause, we hold that the 
residual clause of § 4B1.2(a)(2) is void for vagueness.” 
(quotation marks and citation omitted)). 
 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Johnson supports our 
conclusion.  In its discussion of arbitrary enforcement, the 
Supreme Court cited to cases involving the § 4B1.2 residual 
clause to demonstrate that ACCA’s residual clause is “nearly 
impossible to apply consistently.”  See Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 
2560 (citing United States v. Carthorne, 726 F.3d 503 (4th 
Cir. 2013); United States v. Whitson, 597 F.3d 1218 (11th 
Cir. 2010) (per curiam); United States v. McDonald, 592 F.3d 
808 (7th Cir. 2010); United States v. Williams, 559 F.3d 1143 
(10th Cir. 2009)).  In addition, the Supreme Court vacated the 
sentences of some offenders who were sentenced under the 
residual clause of the Sentencing Guidelines, and remanded to 
the courts of appeals for further consideration in light of 
Johnson.  See United States v. Maldonado, 581 F. App’x 19 
(2d Cir. 2014), vacated, 135 S. Ct. 2929 (2015); Beckles v. 
United States, 579 F. App’x 833 (11th Cir. 2014), vacated, 
135 S. Ct. 2928 (2015).  As noted earlier, this type of 
Supreme Court action is significant.  See Hopkins, 577 F.3d 
at 511.  
 
                                                                                                     
imposes a sentence outside of the recommended range.  553 
U.S. at 713.  At issue in the case before us is not a district 
court’s discretionary variance.  We are instead concerned 
with the imposition of a sentence where a criminal defendant 
has been incorrectly designated a career offender as a matter 
of law — a question over which we exercise de novo review.  
See United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 570 (3d Cir. 2007) 
(en banc).  However, as we hold that the due process concerns 
over arbitrary enforcement are implicated here, we need not 
decide whether the residual clause of section 4B1.2 also 
denied Calabretta fair notice.  
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We hold that the residual clause of the career offender 
Guideline, like ACCA’s residual clause, is infected with 
“hopeless indeterminacy,” Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2558, and is 
unconstitutionally vague in light of Johnson.9  Therefore, we 
conclude that the District Court erred in determining that 




                                              
9 In reaching this holding, we do not address the continued 
viability of other, similar residual clauses present in other 
statutes.  In particular, we emphasize that the residual clause 
of ACCA and the career offender Guideline are not only 
identical in their wording but are also linked to a list of four 
enumerated offenses (preceding the residual clauses) that 
qualify as crimes of violence:  burglary, arson, extortion, and 
crimes involving the use of explosives.  See 18 U.S.C. § 
924(e)(2)(B); U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a) (limiting enumerated 
“burglary” offense to “burglary of a dwelling”).  In Johnson, 
the Supreme Court indicated that ACCA’s “confusing list of 
examples” may have contributed to that residual clause’s 
arbitrariness and unpredictability.  135 S. Ct. at 2561.  The 
language at issue here is the same in that regard.  Thus, we 
need not consider — and so leave for another day — whether 
a similar residual clause without an exemplary list of offenses 
would be subject to the same degree of due process concern 
that the Supreme Court identified in Johnson.  
10 While the Supreme Court recently held in Welch v. United 
States that Johnson announced a substantive rule that applies 
retroactively to cases on collateral review, 136 S. Ct. 1257 
(2016), we need not consider whether the residual clause of 
the career offender enhancement likewise involves a 
substantive rule of law requiring its retroactive application on 
collateral review.  Calabretta’s direct appeal was already 
pending at the time of the Johnson decision.  See Griffith v. 
Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328 (1987) (“[A] new rule for the 
conduct of criminal prosecutions is to be applied retroactively 
to all cases, state or federal, pending on direct review or not 
yet final . . . .”).  
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Second, the error here is plain.  An error that is plain is 
“clear or obvious, rather than subject to reasonable dispute,” 
Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009) (citing 
Olano, 507 U.S. at 734), at the time of appellate 
consideration, see Henderson v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 
1121, 1130-31 (2013).  Although our Court has not ruled on 
the precise question as to whether the residual clause of 
section 4B1.2 is void for vagueness,11 we have previously 
entertained similar challenges, see Maurer, 639 F.3d at 78 
n.4, and we have held that Supreme Court cases construing 
ACCA “bind our analysis” of the career offender Guideline, 
Marrero, 743 F.3d at 394 n.2.  Therefore, as Johnson was 
decided while Calabretta’s appeal was pending, and as our 
Court has consistently construed the career offender 




Third, the error affected Calabretta’s substantial rights.  
“[T]o have affected a defendant’s substantial rights, a plain 
error must have caused the defendant prejudice, in that it 
‘affected the outcome of the district court proceedings.’”  
United States v. Tann, 577 F.3d 533, 538 (3d Cir. 2009) 
(quoting Olano, 507 U.S. at 734).  The Supreme Court 
recently held that “[w]hen a defendant is sentenced under an 
incorrect Guidelines range — whether or not the defendant’s 
ultimate sentence falls within the correct range — the error 
                                              
11 Our Court need not have previously ruled on a precise issue 
for an error to be plain.  See, e.g., United States v. Tann, 577 
F.3d 533, 537 (3d Cir. 2009) (holding error to be “plain” in a 
matter of first impression where prior cases “deal[t] with 
analogous statutes”).  Nor does it change our analysis that the 
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has held differently.  Our 
circuit precedent is sufficiently clear such that the error is 
plain.  
12 We also note that, unlike other courts of appeals that have 
found no plain error in cases arising out of similar facts, see 
Ellis, 815 F.3d at 421-22, our Court has never held that the 




can, and most often will, be sufficient to show a reasonable 
probability of a different outcome absent the error.”  Molina-
Martinez v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1338, 1345 (2016).  The 
Government, however, “remains free to point to parts of the 
record — including relevant statements by the judge — to 
counter any ostensible showing of prejudice the defendant 
may make.”  Id. at 1347 (quotation marks and alterations 
omitted).  Accordingly, “in the ordinary case a defendant will 
satisfy his burden to show prejudice by pointing to the 
application of an incorrect, higher Guidelines range and the 
sentence he received thereunder.  Absent unusual 
circumstances, he will not be required to show more.”  Id. 
 
Despite conceding that Calabretta is no longer a career 
offender, the Government maintains that the error did not 
affect Calabretta’s substantial rights.  The Government points 
to the District Court’s downward variance and the District 
Court’s explanation that “‘a sentence of 120 months . . . is the 
minimum sentence sufficient to secure the purposes of 
sentencing that are set forth in [section] 3553’” as indications 
that the District Court would have imposed the same sentence 
irrespective of the Guidelines range.  See Gov’t Letter 
Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 28(j) (July 28, 2015) (quoting 
App. 143).  We disagree with the Government’s contentions.  
The record in this case does not “show . . . that the district 
court thought the sentence it chose was appropriate 
irrespective of the Guidelines range.”  Molina-Martinez, 136 
S. Ct. at 1346. 
 
There are indications in the record that the application 
of the career offender enhancement did affect Calabretta’s 
sentence.  The District Court placed significant emphasis on 
Calabretta’s criminal history and his lack of “reform.”  App. 
141-43.  The sentencing court noted that Calabretta was “not 
a stranger to the criminal justice system,” that he “should 
have learned [his] lesson” from his prior convictions, and that 
his eluding conviction, in particular, “compounded” his lack 
of reform.  App. 141.  After focusing on Calabretta’s prior 
convictions, the District Court indicated its belief that “a very 
substantial sentence is required,” in part, “to get through to 
[Calabretta] that if [he] thought [he] had reformed, reforming 
by becoming a drug dealer is not reforming.”  App. 142.  We 
do not think any of those observations inapt, but we cannot 
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divine whether the District Court would have placed such 
emphasis on Calabretta’s criminal history and his eluding 
conviction, had he not been designated a career offender 
convicted of multiple, prior “crimes of violence.”   
Additionally, the District Court denied Calabretta’s 
request for a two-level reduction in his offense level based on 
anticipated amendments to the Guidelines that lowered the 
offense level for certain narcotics offenses.13  In denying 
Calabretta’s request, the District Court noted that Calabretta, 
as a career offender, would be ineligible for a sentence 
reduction under the amended Guidelines.  App. 131-32.  We 
cannot intuit whether the District Court would have granted 
the request if Calabretta were not a career offender, but we 
note that the District Court did grant such a request for two of 
Calabretta’s co-defendants who were not designated career 
offenders with no objection from the Government.14  See 
Gov’t Br. at 9 n.6.  And had the District Court granted the 
reduction, Calabretta’s recommended Guidelines range would 
have been 87 to 108 months.  Calabretta’s 120-month 
                                              
13 Effective November 1, 2014, the United States Sentencing 
Commission adopted Amendment 782, which modified 
section 2D1.1 of the Guidelines to lower the sentencing range 
for certain categories of drug-related offenses.  As Calabretta 
was sentenced in September 2014, the amendment, which 
would have lowered his Total Offense Level by two points, 
did not apply to him.  The Sentencing Commission, however, 
also adopted Amendment 788, effective November 1, 2014, 
which authorized retroactive application of Amendment 782 
to certain defendants sentenced before its effective date.  
However, if the sentence were “based on” the defendant’s 
career offender status, rather than “based on” section 2D1.1, 
the defendant would be ineligible for a sentencing reduction 
under the Amendments.  See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2); 
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10; United States v. Flemming, 723 F.3d 407, 
411-13 (3d Cir. 2013).  
14 Not only was there no objection from the Government in 
these instances, it also appears that it was Department of 
Justice policy not to object to such requests for early 
application of the Guidelines Amendment.  See App. 82 n.1.  
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sentence, then, would constitute a 12-month upward variance 
from that Guidelines range.15 
Moreover, we emphasize the sheer magnitude of the 
disparity between Calabretta’s correct Guidelines range and 
his erroneously-enhanced Guidelines range.  Designated a 
career offender, Calabretta had a Guidelines range of 188 to 
235 months of imprisonment.  Absent that enhancement, his 
range was calculated as 108 to 135 months of imprisonment 
— or perhaps 87 to 108 months of imprisonment with a 
Guidelines range reduction in anticipation of Amendment 
782.  The difference amounts to years of additional time in 
prison.  By contrast, the Supreme Court held in Molina-
Martinez that an erroneous Guidelines calculation that 
affected the defendant’s range by seven months constituted 
plain error.  136 S. Ct. at 1344.  The size of the miscalculation 
here thus weighs strongly in favor of the conclusion that the 
error affected Calabretta’s substantial rights.  
 
We hold that the Guidelines miscalculation here is 
sufficient to show a reasonable probability that his sentence 
would have been different absent the error.  We cannot 
assume here that the sentencing court would have imposed 
                                              
15 Our dissenting colleague suggests that the applicability of 
Amendment 782 should not weigh in favor of exercising our 
discretion to remand for resentencing as retroactive relief is 
available to Calabretta now that he is no longer considered a 
career offender.  However, a district court is limited in its 
ability to resentence a criminal defendant who is eligible for 
relief under Amendments 782 and 788.  Unless a defendant 
received a sentencing departure pursuant to a Government 
motion regarding substantial assistance, a district court cannot 
grant a sentence reduction that is less than the minimum of 
the amended Sentencing Guidelines range.  See 18 U.S.C. § 
3582(c)(2); U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10.  Thus, if Calabretta could 
only seek relief through a sentencing reduction motion made 
pursuant to Amendments 782 and 788, the minimum sentence 
he could receive is 87 months of imprisonment.  If, however, 
we remand for resentencing, the District Court could decide 
to impose a sentence as low as 60 months — the mandatory 
minimum sentence.  This difference also weighs in favor of 
us exercising our discretion to afford relief.   
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the same sentence regardless of the career offender 
designation.  To assume so — particularly when the record 
suggests that Calabretta’s criminal history played a role in the 
ultimate sentence imposed — would “place us in the zone of 
speculation and conjecture.”  United States v. Zabielski, 711 
F.3d 381, 387 (3d Cir. 2013) (quotation marks and alteration 
marks omitted) (applying harmless error review).  Therefore, 
Calabretta has demonstrated that the District Court’s error 




The Supreme Court has recently reminded us that 
“[u]nder the Olano framework, appellate courts retain broad 
discretion in determining whether a remand for resentencing 
is necessary.”16  Molina-Martinez, 136 S. Ct. at 1348.  But 
that broad discretion should not be exercised reflexively when 
the other elements of the plain error standard are met.  Olano, 
507 U.S. at 737 (“[A] plain error affecting substantial rights 
does not, without more, satisfy the [plain error standard], for 
otherwise the discretion afforded by the [standard] would be 
illusory.”); see United States v. John, 597 F.3d 263, 288-89 
(5th Cir. 2010) (“The discretion inherent in the plain-error 
standard is not tantamount to caprice, nor is it to be exercised 
because of sympathy or lack thereof for a particular 
individual or the public’s or a judge’s opinion as to the 
seriousness or heinous nature of a particular crime.”).  Our 
discretion is properly exercised in case-specific circumstances 
where an error “seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or 
public reputation of judicial proceedings.”  Olano, 507 U.S. at 
736 (quotation marks omitted).  That considerable standard 
has been met in this case.   
 
                                              
16 We note that, in Molina-Martinez, the Supreme Court 
described the Government’s “concern over the judicial 
resources needed for the resentencing proceedings” 
as“unfounded.”  136 S. Ct. at 1348-49.  “[E]ven when a Court 
of Appeals does decide that resentencing is appropriate, a 
remand for resentencing, while not costless, does not invoke 
the same difficulties as a remand for retrial does.”  Id. 
(quotation marks omitted). 
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Calabretta’s advisory Guidelines sentencing range 
would have been substantially lower if he had not been 
labelled a career offender.  If the District Court had applied a 
two-level reduction in offense level in anticipation of 
Amendment 782 — like it did with two of Calabretta’s co-
defendants — then Calabretta’s sentence represents a 12-
month upward variance from the applicable Guidelines range.  
Nor is this a situation where the District Court made clear that 
Calabretta’s career offender status did not have an effect on 
his sentencing range.  At his sentencing hearing, the District 
Court repeatedly emphasized Calabretta’s criminal history 
and lack of reform following his prior convictions.17  
                                              
17 Our dissenting colleague contends that the District Court 
“did not apply the career offender Guidelines range,” and 
emphasizes repeatedly that the District Court indicated that 
Calabretta’s sentence was the “minimum sentence sufficient.”  
But the District Court did apply the career offender 
Guideline, even though it ultimately sentenced Calabretta to a 
below-Guidelines sentence.  By indicating that it was 
imposing the “minimum sentence sufficient,” the District 
Court was simply following the statutory text of section 
3553(a), which requires district courts to “impose a sentence 
sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the 
purposes [of criminal sentencing].”  18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).  
This “parsimony” principle is so inherent in the sentencing 
process that district judges need not even announce their 
adherence to it when sentencing a criminal defendant.  See 
United States v. Dragon, 471 F.3d 501, 506 (3d Cir. 2006) 
(“[W]e hold that district judges are not required by the 
parsimony provision to routinely state that the sentence 
imposed is the minimum sentence necessary to achieve the 
purposes set forth in § 3553(a)(2).”).  Merely quoting this 
language should not insulate a sentence from harmless error 
or plain error review.  The District Court never indicated that 
it would have imposed the same sentence regardless of 
Calabretta’s career offender status.  Rather, the District Court 
imposed what it determined was the “minimum sentence 
sufficient” in considering the section 3553(a) factors — 
which includes “the applicable category of offense committed 
by the applicable category of defendant as set forth in the 
guidelines.”  18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4)(A).  Thus, if the District 
Court were applying the section 3553(a) factors as is 
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Therefore, we cannot presume that the District Court would 
have likely imposed the same sentence had Calabretta not 
been designated a career offender.  It is possible — perhaps 
even likely, given the below-Guidelines sentences of 
Calabretta and those of his co-defendants — that the District 
Court still would have imposed a below-Guidelines sentence 
under the correct Guidelines range.18 
 
We are convinced that if we were to affirm 
Calabretta’s sentence, which was imposed against the 
backdrop of a legally incorrect career offender designation 
                                                                                                     
statutorily required, then its calculation of the “minimum 
sentence sufficient” necessarily included consideration of the 
recommended Guidelines range, including Calabretta’s career 
offender status.  
18 Our dissenting colleague suggests that we are trying to 
“have it both ways” by “attempting to undertake such a 
prediction [of what the District Court will do on remand] 
while, at the same time, arguing that [the dissent is] 
undergoing a speculative analysis” of its own.  Dissent Slip 
Op. at 9.  We are not speculating about the District Court’s 
actions.   The dissent, however, reads such certainty into this 
scant record that it would lead to affirmance of a 120-month 
sentence despite a significant Guideline miscalculation.  Our 
position is that any prediction of what the District Court 
would have done about sentencing if it had calculated the 
Guidelines correctly necessarily calls for speculation and that 
is the very reason there must be a remand.  As noted earlier, 
the Supreme Court recently instructed that such uncertainty 
weighs in favor of resentencing, not affirmance.  See Molina-
Martinez, 136 S. Ct. at 1347 (“Where . . . the record is silent 
as to what the district court might have done had it considered 
the correct Guidelines range, the court’s reliance on an 
incorrect range in most instances will suffice to show an 
effect on the defendant’s substantial rights.  Indeed, in the 
ordinary case a defendant will satisfy his burden to show 
prejudice by pointing to the application of an incorrect, higher 
Guidelines range and the sentence he received thereunder.  
Absent unusual circumstances, he will not be required to 
show more.”).  The uncertainty here should be resolved by 
the District Court. 
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and a significantly higher Guidelines range, it would indeed 
seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation of 
judicial proceedings.  See Madrid, 805 F.3d at 1212 (“[W]hen 
the correct application of the sentencing laws would likely 
significantly reduce the length of the sentence, circuit courts 
have almost uniformly held the error to implicate 
fundamental fairness issues.” (quotation marks omitted)); cf. 
Tai, 750 F.3d at 320 (“[W]e exercise our discretion to correct 
the error because it increased the sentence without the 
necessary fact finding and thereby affected the integrity of the 
proceedings.”).  Accordingly, we will exercise our discretion 




 In sum, Calabretta has demonstrated the requisite 
elements to establish plain error, and we will exercise our 
discretion to award appropriate relief.  We will thus vacate 




FISHER, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 
 The majority holds that Johnson v. United States, 135 
S. Ct. 2551 (2015), invalidates the residual clause of United 
States Sentencing Guideline § 4B1.2, removing Michael 
Calabretta’s status as a career offender. I agree with this 
portion of the majority’s opinion.1  
 
 But, that is where my agreement with the majority 
ends, as based on the sentencing record, the majority also 
finds that the District Court plainly erred when it considered 
Calabretta’s now-removed career offender status in imposing 
its sentence. Though I agree that Johnson should apply in this 
case and that Calabretta no longer meets the career offender 
criteria, I disagree that the District Court’s careful and 
thoughtful analysis at sentencing, which concluded in a 
sentence of 120 months’ imprisonment, was plainly 
erroneous. I dissent specifically to address the erosion of the 
doctrine of plain error review in our Circuit. 
 
                                              
1 As the majority notes, Johnson’s application to § 
4B1.2 was considered by the Eleventh Circuit in United 
States v. Matchett, 802 F.3d 1185 (11th Cir. 2015). The 
Matchett court was concerned that other sections of the 
Guidelines may be invalidated if the void-for-vagueness 
doctrine is applied to § 4B1.2 via Johnson and rejected the 
petitioner’s argument that Johnson invalidates § 4B1.2’s 
residual clause. I recognize Judge Pryor’s well-written 
opinion and the possible future consequences the adoption of 
Johnson may have. See also United States v. Ellis, 815 F.3d 
419, 422 (8th Cir. 2016) (finding that it is not “obvious that 
the guidelines are susceptible to a constitutional vagueness 
challenge”). 
On the other hand, several circuits and this Court—as 
outlined by the majority—have applied ACCA holdings to 
identically-worded sections of the Guidelines, including those 
courts that have already considered Johnson and applied it to 
§ 4B1.2. Accordingly, based on our precedent, I join the 
majority in applying Johnson.  
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 Michael Calabretta is no smalltime marijuana dealer, 
just selling some of his stash to a few friends to support a 
habit or to make ends meet. Rather, for more than two-and-a-
half years, he participated in an extensive cross-country 
conspiracy that distributed over 100 kilograms of marijuana 
and he personally laundered more than ten million dollars in 
drug sale proceeds. 
 
 In spite of this formidable backdrop, Calabretta asks us 
to find that the District Court plainly erred when it imposed a 
120 months’ sentence, a sentence that was well below the 
career offender Guidelines range and can only be viewed as 
an act of leniency—the maximum leniency the District Court 
felt was deserved. We should not grant his request because, as 
the District Court clearly found, Calabretta’s sentence was the 
“minimum sentence sufficient.” J.A. 143. 
 
 If a defendant fails to timely object at the time a 
sentence is pronounced, as Calabretta failed to, the 
unpreserved issue is reviewed for plain error. United States v. 
Flores-Mejia, 759 F.3d 253, 259 (3d Cir. 2014). In order to 
satisfy the first three prongs of plain error, an appellant must 
establish that an error occurred, that the error was clear or 
obvious, and the error affected his substantial rights. If those 
requirements are met, we move to the fourth prong and 
determine if the “error seriously affect[s] the fairness, 
integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” United 
States v. Marcus, 560 U.S. 258, 262 (2010) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). If after a fact-intensive analysis we 
determine that the fourth prong has been established, we have 
the discretion to remedy the error. Puckett v. United States, 
556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009). 
 
 Here, the fourth prong has not been met. The District 
Court based its sentence on Calabretta’s serious and extensive 
underlying and prior criminal conduct, not on his career 
offender status—and it specifically found that 120 months’ 
incarceration was the minimum sentence it would impose. 
This is not an unfair sentence. Nor is it one that will affect the 
integrity or public reputation of the judiciary. Further, the 
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majority’s holding is troubling because the plain error test, 
specifically its fourth prong, requires stringent application. 
This holding will not only affect Calabretta but may affect 
future proceedings: a broadened plain error analysis will now 
apply in these cases. I therefore respectfully dissent from the 




 Calabretta has a significant criminal history, and he 
committed a serious crime. The District Court carefully 
considered these concerns and the other factors under 18 
U.S.C. § 3553(a) and determined that, despite the career 
offender Guidelines range (that it erroneously found applied), 
a 120 months’ sentence was sufficient but was the minimum 
sentence sufficient. Where the District Court provides this 
type of specificity, remand is not required.  
 
 In considering Calabretta’s sentence under the fourth 
prong, we must remember that remand is a discretionary 
action that we may take only after a full review of the 
underlying facts. There is no basis for exercising our 
discretion where evidence otherwise overwhelmingly 
supports the trial court’s finding or is conclusive. United 
States v. Vazquez, 271 F.3d 93, 106 (3d Cir. 2001). Although 
a scant record cannot uphold a sentence based on an 
erroneous Guidelines range, “[t]he record in a case may show 
. . . that the district court thought the sentence it chose was 
appropriate irrespective of the Guidelines range. Judges may 
find that some cases merit a detailed explanation of the 
reasons the selected sentence is appropriate.” Molina-
Martinez v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1338, 1346 (2016). This 
rule of analysis, penned by the Supreme Court in its recent 
decision in Molina-Martinez, is based on evidence that 
indicates the Guidelines are heavily relied upon by district 
courts in arriving at a sentence—in most cases.  
 The Supreme Court observed that in a majority of 
cases, absent a Government motion, district courts imposed 
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sentences within the adopted Guidelines range.2 This case is 
an outlier. And, the record provides a clear picture of what the 
District Court intended. Calabretta was subject to, based on 
the incorrectly calculated Guidelines range, 188 to 235 
months’ imprisonment. If § 4B1.2 had not applied, 
Calabretta’s Guidelines range would have been 108 to 135 
months’ imprisonment. Ultimately, Calabretta was sentenced 
within the applicable Guidelines range that would have 
applied without the career offender enhancement, receiving a 
sentence of 120 months’ imprisonment. This sentence was 
outside of the career offender Guidelines range by almost six 
years and was not the product of a Government motion. 
Calabretta’s sentence is thus in the minority of cases cited in 
Molina-Martinez and upholding it would not garner ridicule 
of this Court.  
 
 This is unlike a case our sister court grappled with 
after Molina-Martinez. In United States v. Hudson, -- F.3d --, 
2016 WL 2621093 (1st Cir. May 9, 2016), the First Circuit 
found plain error where the defendant received a sentence that 
was within an erroneously calculated Guidelines range, 
despite the district court’s consideration of the defendant’s 
“quite serious” conduct and extensive criminal history. Id. at 
*6–7. The Hudson court made this finding, however, because 
the career offender Guidelines range was the “anchoring 
point” for the imposed sentence. Id. at *7. Here, the District 
Court was aware of the career offender Guidelines range; 
carefully reviewed Calabretta’s substantial underlying 
conduct, criminal history, and the other statutory sentencing 
factors; and found that 120 months’ incarceration—a sentence 
substantially lower than the career offender Guidelines 
range—was the “minimum sentence sufficient” to suit the 18 
                                              
2 “In less than 20% of cases since 2007 . . . district 
courts imposed above- or below-Guidelines sentences absent 
a Government motion . . . [a] realit[y] that has led the Court 
to observe that there is considerable empirical evidence 
indicating that the Sentencing Guidelines have the intended 
effect of influencing the sentences imposed by judges.” Id. 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
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U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. J.A. 143. The career offender 
Guidelines range was not the anchoring point here, the 
District Court specifically chose to not apply it to the final 
sentence. 
 
 The majority focuses on the District Court’s failure to 
specifically state how Calabretta’s career offender 
designation affected the final sentence, but the record reveals 
that the District Court provided detailed reasons for how it 
arrived at the final sentence and why it did not apply the 
career offender Guidelines range.  
 
 Calabretta pleaded guilty to both a distribution offense 
and a money laundering offense, a plea that allowed him to 
escape a weightier sentence if the full import of his conduct in 
the distribution scheme had been considered. At sentencing, 
the District Court reviewed the underlying investigation 
which resulted in the recovery of over $1 million from 
Calabretta’s residence, which was a small part of the earnings 
from the distribution scheme, and a log book that indicated 
that Calabretta was involved in laundering drug money 
through casinos. The District Court found it questionable that 
Calabretta’s claimed income, which Calabretta said was 
gambling income, was not a part of the drug distribution 
scheme. Moreover, the District Court considered the need for 
deterrence given the purely monetary motivation that drove 
Calabretta’s conduct, noting that Calabretta and his co-
conspirators believed “that moving large amounts of 
marijuana was a good way to make lots of money and the 
record reflects that he did that.” J.A. 140. 
 
 As for Calabretta’s prior criminal conduct, the District 
Court found especially alarming the fact that Calabretta had 
“two dead people whose deaths are directly attributable to 
[his], frankly, incredible conduct” of drag racing and road 
rage. J.A. 141. The District Court also considered 
Calabretta’s eluding offense, where he drove up an exit ramp 
the wrong way, as well as other car thefts and burglaries that 
Calabretta had committed, which were not predicate offenses 
under § 4B1.2. Calabretta’s serious criminal history was 
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bolstered by the fact that he committed the drug distribution 
offense only five years after he was released from jail on his 
prior convictions.  
 
 The District Court did not focus on Calabretta’s career 
offender status. To the contrary, it specifically determined not 
to sentence him within the career offender range: “[T]he top 
of [the Guidelines range] was 235 months. . . . If I sentence 
you to the top of that [G]uidelines range, you’d be getting out 
when you were an old man.” J.A. 143. The District Court 
instead focused on the specific case at hand—Calabretta’s 
significant criminal history and culpability in the underlying 
offense. It found that it was “satisfied that a very substantial 
sentence is required here in order to, first of all, deter others 
who might be inclined to make millions of dollars quickly 
and easily from doing it; secondly, to get through to 
[Calabretta] that if [he] thought [he] had reformed, reforming 
by becoming a drug dealer is not reforming.” J.A. 142. This 
led the District Court to find that a sentence of 120 months’ 
imprisonment was the “minimum sentence sufficient”—a 
sentence that was well below the career offender Guidelines 
range.  
 
 The majority faults this dissent for its focus on the 
District Court’s “minimum sentence sufficient” language. The 
District Court’s “minimum sentence sufficient” statement, 
however, followed the District Court’s admonition that it 
would not sentence Calabretta within a Guidelines range that 
would lead to his release when he was an old man. The 
Guidelines range that the District Court chose not to apply, to 
meet that goal, was the career offender Guidelines range. It is 
therefore more than reasonable to focus on the “minimum 
sentence sufficient” language because it followed the District 
Court’s finding that it was not going to sentence Calabretta 
within the career offender Guidelines range. 
 
 Based on the record before us, there is no plain error. 
Affirming Calabretta’s sentence would not undermine the 
integrity of this Court. The District Court provided a detailed 
explanation of the imposed sentence, a sentence unconnected 
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from the Guidelines. The District Court weighed Calabretta’s 
potential for recidivism, and we should not ignore that 
consideration when conducting plain error review, especially 
where the sentence is far removed from the career offender 
Guidelines range. United States v. Davis, 602 F.3d 643, 652 
(5th Cir. 2010) (considering the defendant’s continued 
violations of the law in upholding his sentence even though 
the district court had conducted an erroneous Guidelines 
calculation at sentencing).3  
 
 The sentence imposed by the District Court fell within 
the now-applicable Guidelines range. The majority argues 
that the potential applicability of Amendment 782,4 which 
would make Calabretta’s 120 months’ sentence fall outside of 
the Guidelines range, should change the analysis in this case. 
But it does not. Calabretta’s Guidelines range would be 87 to 
108 months after applying Amendment 782. Calabretta would 
be eligible to receive a sentence of 87 months’ imprisonment 
if the District Court, through its discretion, found that 
sentence to be appropriate. The majority asserts that because 
of this amended Guidelines range, the District Court could 
also decide to impose a sentence as low as 60 months, the 
mandatory minimum sentence for Calabretta’s charged 
conduct. We cannot predict what the District Court will do. 
The majority is attempting to undertake such a prediction 
while, at the same time, arguing that I am undergoing a 
speculative analysis by relying on the District Court’s actual 
words during sentencing. The majority cannot have it both 
ways. 
 The large disparity between the prior applicable 
Guidelines range and the sentence imposed, a variance 
sentence without a Government motion, supports a finding 
                                              
3 The Fifth Circuit upheld Davis’s consideration of 
recidivism as a factor in denying a plain error claim after 
Molina-Martinez in United States v. Martinez-Rodriguez, -- 
F.3d --, 2016 WL 2772272 *4–5 (5th Cir. May 12, 2016). 
4 Calabretta’s non-career offender status will allow 
him to seek a sentence that comports with Amendment 782 
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).  
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under Molina-Martinez that the District Court gave a fair 
sentence that was unaffected by the career offender 
designation. Instead, the sentence was motivated by 
Calabretta’s own conduct and was the “minimum sentence 
sufficient” to deter such conduct in the future. Still, the 
majority cites two of our opinions and a Tenth Circuit opinion 
in support of its position that such a finding would be 
“speculative.” These cases—United States v. Zabielski, 711 
F.3d 381 (3d Cir. 2013), United States v. Tai, 750 F.3d 309 
(3d Cir. 2014), and United States v. Madrid, 805 F.3d 1204 
(2015)—actually support affirmance. 
 
 Zabielski was determined under a harmless error 
analysis and is distinguishable from our analysis here, which 
is more stringent. Even if generally applicable, we held that 
“an error is more likely to be harmless when it is clear from 
the record that the district court decided to vary from the 
advisory Guidelines range.” Zabielski, 711 F.3d at 388. It is 
clear from the sentencing record, for the reasons above, that 
the District Court was not considering the career offender 
Guidelines range. The majority’s assertion that affirming 
would be based on “speculation” is unsubstantiated. 
 
 Tai is unhelpful to the majority for the same reasons. 
We held in Tai that where the record fails to provide guidance 
as to why a particular enhancement was provided, and the 
proper fact finding regarding that enhancement is not 
undertaken, this Court may find that the integrity of the 
proceedings are affected. Tai, 750 F.3d at 319–20.  Under 
such circumstances, this Court cannot speculate as to what 
facts were considered by the district court. Id. at 320.  Again, 
the record here provides guidance. The District Court 
reviewed the underlying circumstances, disregarded the 
career offender Guidelines range, and sentenced Calabretta 
well below the erroneous range. 
 
 Finally, in Madrid, the Tenth Circuit applied Johnson 
to Madrid, a defendant that had erroneously been found to be 
a career offender. The court focused on Madrid’s sentence of 
188 months, a sentence at the lowest end of the erroneous 
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career offender Guidelines range. The court found that the 
fourth prong had been met because the “correct application of 
the sentencing laws would likely significantly reduce the 
length of the sentence” because the now-applicable 
Guidelines range was 92-115 months. Madrid, 805 F.3d at 
1212 (internal quotation marks omitted). The facts are 
distinguishable here. Calabretta was subject to a sentence 
within the lower, applicable Guidelines range and the District 
Court chose to forego a career offender sentence, opting to 
instead sentence Calabretta to 120 months, the “minimum 
sentence sufficient.”  
 
 This Court should not fall into a trap of finding that 
every sentence that applied § 4B1.2’s residual clause requires 
a remand. I am not suggesting that the fourth prong will never 
be met if Johnson is applied to others who were incorrectly 
found to be career offenders. But the sentence that Calabretta 
received is neither unfair nor will it undermine confidence in 





 Given the record before us, I believe the majority fails 
to adhere to this Court’s duty to narrowly apply the plain 
error rule, especially once it reaches the fourth prong. We 
must be forward thinking and look not only at the underlying 
proceeding but also to how future judicial proceedings will be 
affected by our plain error analysis in each case. United States 
v. Escalante-Reyes, 689 F.3d 415, 457 n.22 (5th Cir. 2012) 
(Smith, J., dissenting). The majority’s conclusion that the 
fourth prong has been met in this case will affect future 
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judicial proceedings by broadening the application of plain 
error review. Review which has already been eroding.5  
 
 This prong must be applied vigorously even where an 
error is found because of an intervening Supreme Court 
decision. United States v. Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 F.3d 727, 
737 (10th Cir. 2005) (discussing the applicability of Johnson 
v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 470 (1997)). Consequently, it 
is important to carefully consider the fourth prong because 
“[r]eversal for error, regardless of its effect on the judgment, 
encourages litigants to abuse the judicial process and bestirs 
the public to ridicule it.” Johnson, 520 U.S. at 470 (citation 
omitted). 
                                              
5Several of this Court’s cases have resulted in remand 
based on a finding of plain error. A sampling of these cases is 
set forth below. In these cases, we either (1) did not include a 
fourth prong analysis, or (2) included only a sentence or less 
of analysis under the fourth prong. This is why it is important 
that this dissent focus on the fourth prong and that a finding 
of plain error should be a rarity. Those cases are cited here:  
United States v. Angell, 588 F. App’x 161 (3d Cir. 
2014); United States v. Stinson, 734 F.3d 180 (3d Cir. 2013); 
United States v. Butler, 531 F. App’x 241 (3d Cir. 2013); 
United States v. Hill, 468 F. App’x 133 (3d Cir. 2012); United 
States v. Rose, 365 F. App’x 384 (3d Cir. 2010); United 
States v. Guinto, 345 F. App’x 831 (3d Cir. 2009); United 
States v. Polk, 577 F.3d 515 (3d Cir. 2009); United States v. 
Berry, 553 F.3d 273, 286 (3d Cir. 2009); United States v. 
Langford, 516 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2008); United States v. 
Voelker, 489 F.3d 139 (3d Cir. 2007); United States v. Wood, 
486 F.3d 781 (3d Cir. 2007); United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 
556 (3d Cir. 2007); United States v. Dickerson, 381 F.3d 251 
(3d Cir. 2004); United States v. Broskoski, 66 F. App’x 317 
(3d Cir. 2003); United States v. Syme, 276 F.3d 131 (3d Cir. 
2002); United States v. Latimer, 54 F. App’x 105 (3d Cir. 
2002); United States v. Knight, 266 F.3d 203 (3d Cir. 2001); 
United States v. Pollen, 978 F.2d 78 (3d Cir. 1992); United 
States v. Evans, 155 F.3d 245 (3d Cir. 1998). 
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 This public ridicule and encouragement of abuse of 
process is precisely what we must be aware of in ordering 
remand in this case. Even if Calabretta’s substantial rights 
were affected, this “cannot, ‘without more,’ satisfy the fourth 
prong of the plain-error analysis, . . . and the Supreme Court 
has instructed that we are authorized ‘to correct only 
particularly egregious errors’ on plain-error review.” United 
States v. Corso, 549 F.3d 921, 931 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting 
United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 15 (1985) (internal 
citation omitted)). 
 
 In sentencing matters, this means that we must 
consider the effect that a too low or too high sentence may 
have. For instance, a sentence that is too-low will deny the 
public of its entitlement to a sufficient sentence, but one that 
is too-high will deny a defendant a certain amount of 
freedom. United States v. Williams, 399 F.3d 450, 456 (2d 
Cir. 2005). Here, the District Court specifically stated that 
imprisonment of 120 months was the “minimum sentence 
sufficient” based on Calabretta’s criminal history and his 
underlying conduct while discounting the career offender 
Guidelines range. Calabretta received leniency at the 
sentencing phase, a leniency that he likely did not deserve, 
but the District Court made clear this was the only break that 
Calabretta was entitled to. 
 
 It is hard to determine what record, if not the one here, 
would not meet the majority’s standard for plain error. A 
district court will now be required to specifically say, no 
matter what happens in the future, the sentence imposed is the 
only sentence it would give within its discretion. I do not 
believe that we should implement this rule. We must be 
especially cognizant of this consideration and ensure that 
plain error is found only in “exceptional circumstances [for] 
particularly egregious errors,” is “used sparingly,” and is not 
collapsed into a harmless error analysis. Escalante-Reyes, 689 
F.3d at 433, 435. When applying the specific facts in this 
case, I believe that the majority has lost sight of the stringent 






 I dissent in order to caution this Court to review how 
the facts in this case will impermissibly broaden the doctrine 
of plain error review. The District Court’s reasoned analysis 
at sentencing, and careful consideration of the correct 
sentence for a weighty drug dealer, requires Calabretta’s 
sentence of 120 months’ imprisonment to stand, and remand, 
accordingly, should not be granted.  
